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INSTITUTIONS AND LINGUISTIC
CONVENTIONS: THE PRAGMATISM OF
LIEBER'S LEGAL HERMENEUTICS
Guyora Binder*
I.

LEGAL HERMENEUTICS TODAY

Like many other forms of social thought, legal theory has,
over the last quarter century, taken an "interpretive" turn. Recent
and contemporary writing on legal hermeneutics may be credited
with two sensible but unsurprising claims about legal language.
First, much of this literature repeats the now familiar objections to empiricist conceptions of linguistic meaning developed by
Ludwig Wittgenstein, W.V.O. Quine, and other pragmatist philosophers: that all thought is mediated by language, that language is
conventional, that there can be no private language of sensation,
that there can be no theory-free description of sense-data, that
meaning is use. Generally these ideas are deployed in ritually
slaughtering imaginary proponents of the view that the meaning of
legal texts can be authoritatively fixed by reference to the intentions or other mental states of their authors.
Second, much of the recent legal hermeneutics also repeats
the pragmatist attack on rationalist conceptions of linguistic meaning. Thus, from the maxim that all thought is in language, it follows
that concepts are always conventional categories, to be used and
interpreted in light of the experiences and expectations of communities of language-users; that the contents of such conventional categories may be linked by historical association rather than any
shared characteristic; that the domains of concepts are therefore
inherently instable and their boundaries indeterminate. Generally
legal hermeneutic scholarship applies these points in ritually
slaughtering imaginary proponents of the view that the meaning of
legal texts is fixed by their language.
From these sensible claims about the indeterminacy of legal
meaning, legal hermeneutic scholars frequently derive a third,
more dubious claim: that the indeterminacy of legal texts undermines the legitimacy of legal interpretation. The more subversive
efforts at legal hermeneutics tend to leave off at this point, their
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. Research
for this Article was supported by a Magavern Faculty Fellowship.
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critical task completed. The more meliorative efforts proceed with
performative demonstrations that sensitivity and imagination can
produce persuasive interpretive arguments nonetheless. Yet both
share a sense that legal indeterminacy necessitates a legitimation
crisis.
When legal hermeneuticists equate indeterminacy with illegitimacy they forget the lessons of their own pragmatism. Linguistic
meaning is indeterminate only in the sense that it is conventional,
and so contingent on the evolving practice of a community of language users. Legal interpretation similarly is a conventional practice. Moreover, a convention is precisely the sort of entity to which
the adjective legitimate applies. When conventions cease to be legitimate, they cease to be conventions. So why does the admission
that interpretation is conventional delegitimate it? Even granting
that the conventions of legal argument include the invocation of
"legislative intent" and "plain meaning," lawyers can and do perform these conventions while recognizing them as such.
The crisis of judicial legitimacy to which contemporary legal
hermeneutics responds is real enough, but its sources are not philosophical. The legitimacy crisis with which American legal scholarship has struggled for the better part of a century is not occasioned
by the resistance of language in general to interpretation. It is occasioned by the resistance to interpretation of the Civil War
Amendments in particular. Until American society accepts its constitutional obligation to disestablish racial hierarchy, the Civil War
Amendments are inevitably meaningless. Since these amendments
define the constitutional status of the states, this toxin of meaninglessness circulates through every organ of American government,
reducing every policy issue to nonsense. The roots of our crisis of
constitutional hermeneutics are in enduring cleavages in American
society and politics-race foremost-and its challenges are political rather than technical.
II.

LIEBER's CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE

Francis Lieber's remarkable treatise, Legal and Political Hermeneutics,' was written before the Civil War was even imaginable.
Its politics are complacent, conventional, conservative. But it
1 FRANCES LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, OR PRINCIPLES OF INTER-

PRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS (William

G. Hammond ed., 3d ed.,
St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 1880) (1837), republished in 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1883
(1995). [In subsequent citations, the page number as it appears in the republication will be
given in brackets following the page citation to the third edition.]
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would be a mistake to retroject into his time our own anxieties
about the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights that did not
yet exist. Nor should we mistake his lack of historical prescience
for philosophical naivet6. To the contrary: Lieber's antebellum account of legal interpretation as a conventional practice illustrates
how contemporary pragmatist legal theorists might well think
about interpretation if our society and constitution were not so
fundamentally opposed. Indeed, contemporary legal pragmatists
would sound more like Lieber if they thought about any subject
other than constitutional law.2 Reading Lieber's sensible account
of legal interpretation therefore teaches the salutary lesson that
our difficulties are political, not epistemological; so that for the
past quarter century, legal theory has been barking up the wrong
tree.
III.

LIEBER'S ORIGINS AND INTELLECTUAL MILIEU

Born in turn-of-the-century Prussia to a family of ardent na-

tionalists, Lieber fought Napoleon, and later studied at Jena, Halle,
and Berlin during the tenure there of Friedrich Schleiermacher,
G.W.F. Hegel, and Friedrich Karl von Savigny. Lieber became an

ardent enthusiast of Schleiermacher's preaching, 3 a participant in
reformist political intrigue, and a mediocre poet. After joining

other romantic intellectuals from all over Europe in the Greek
rebellion against the Ottomans, Lieber became a protege of the
Prussian Ambassador in Rome, Barthold Niebuhr, a classical philologist devoted to Burkean ideas.4 A brief sojourn in England
before his emigration to the United States brought him in contact
with utilitarianism. In the United States, he became an author and
lecturer on many subjects, a professor of politics and law (at the
University of South Carolina and Columbia University), and a contributor of belletristic essays to literary reviews.
Like many German liberals of this generation, Lieber opposed

natural law theory on the ground that democracy must be mediated
2 Dennis Patterson provides an example of a legal pragmatist whose primary focus on
private law seems to have inspired a conventionalism reminiscent of Lieber's. See, e.g.,

Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism:Law as Practice and Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV.
937 (1990); Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (1988).
3 FRANK FREIDEL, FRANCIS LIEBER: NINETEENTH-CENTURY LIBERAL 21-22 (Peter

Smith 1968) (1947).
4 Id. at 35-37.
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by historically evolved institutions. Upon emigrating to the
United States in the Jacksonian era, Lieber came to identify common law judicial precedent with the historical jurisprudence advocated by romantic German jurists like Savigny, and to identify the
complex American constitutional structure with the mediating institutions advocated by Hegel and other romantic political theorists. Lieber's many intellectual projects included the editorship of
the phenomenally popular Encyclopedia Americana (1829-1833),6
for which Justice Story supplied the legal entries; and his Civil Liberty and Self-Government (1853), 7 the leading American political
science textbook of the nineteenth century. The latter book argued
that institutionally-mediated disciplines, educates, and ennobles
the citizen-transforming democratic self-government into government of as well as by the self. In his Manual of Political Ethics

(1838-1839),' Lieber developed a conception of a pluralistic polity
in which the diffusion of sovereignty among multiple institutions
would develop law "organically." Lieber's historicism and institutional positivism resonated with the Whig-Federalist conservatism
of Story and Chancellor Kent, who had recommended him for his
first academic post, 9 and to each of whom he dedicated a book.' °
Story praised the Manual as "one of the best Theoretical treatises
on... Government, which has been produced in modern times...
when so many ...

disturbing Doctrines are promulgated," while

Kent enthused to Lieber, "I love you; you are so sound, so conservative ...so very safe."'"

Lieber's remarkable treatise is rightly regarded as a synthesis
of the theological hermeneutics of his spiritual mentor in Germany,
Schleiermacher, and the Whig legal science of his American patrons, Kent and Story. Lieber's synthesis was enabled by convergent and surprisingly contemporary themes in these two
5 Indeed, Vernon Parrington held him responsible for the demise of natural law
thought in America. 2 VERNON PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT
bk. 1, pt. 2, ch. 4 (1927).
6 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA (Francis Lieber ed., Philadelphia, Carey, Lea &
Blanchard 1829).
7 FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT (Philadelphia, Lippincott, Grambo & Co. 1853).
8 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS (Boston, Charles C. Little & James
Brown 1839).
9 FREIDEL, supra note 3, at 118-19.
10 ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

138 (1975).
11 FREIDEL, supra note 3, at 164-65.
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intellectual currents. Let us examine each of these influences in
turn.
IV.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S THEOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS

The term "hermeneutics" derives from Hermes, messenger of
the Gods, and it referred exclusively to the interpretation of religious Scripture before the nineteenth century. Generally, hermeneutics embraced dogmatic methods of interpretation, that is,
methods oriented to conforming the text to extratextual theological commitments. The term applied to the construction of texts
that were symbolic or encoded, requiring some key to unlock their
esoteric meaning. Hermeneutics was a particular focus of interest
in Protestant Germany, where scripture needed to be made more
widely accessible for interpretation. 12 The eighteenth century saw
the emergence of a market among Protestant ministers for manuals
of scriptural interpretation to use in preparing sermons. As the
century wore on, the dogma governing scriptural interpretation increasingly came to be Enlightenment rationalism-philologically
trained theologians hoped that a proper understanding of biblical
texts in their historical context would reveal that they gave expression to the invariant truths of reason. The idea of Geist arose as
part of this effort to justify biblical texts to Enlightenment rationalists. A form of metaphysical knowledge available from human cultural products, the concept of Geist seemed to reconcile reason and
revelation.
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), generally considered
the originator of secular hermeneutics, was also the leading Protestant theologian of the nineteenth century, and a major figure of
German romanticism. Schleiermacher initiated a double revolt
against the eighteenth-century conception of hermeneutics. First,
he denied that hermeneutics consisted only of specialized rules or
keys to obscure texts. Instead, he presented hermeneutics as a general science of understanding for all writings-with the implication
that religious and secular texts were of a common kind. In this way
he prepared the way for treating literary works as canonical texts,
functioning for a national culture as Scripture did for faith. Second, he argued that hermeneutics was not about exposing the rational content of texts for inspection, but of experiencing them in a
more fully human or affective way. The Geist immanent in texts of
12 THE HERMENEUTICS READER: TEXTS OF THE GERMAN TRADITION FROM THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO THE PRESENT 2 (Kurt Mueller-Vollmer ed., 1985) [hereinafter THE HERmNEuTcs READER].
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all kinds was an historically situated, subjective, and particular
human spirit. To understand a text was to experience the emotion
it expressed. By thus replacing metaphysics with emotional experience, Schleiermacher initiated modern theology's psychological
turn and anticipated many of the themes of existentialist philosophy. He also preserved the eighteenth-century notion that religion
was an innate human capacity. Schleiermacher's call for a general
hermeneutics stemmed from his view that this capacity to emotionally apprehend spirit was, the font of all culture and communication. Religious sensibility therefore enabled the appreciation of art
and literature. Accepting the new romantic account of aesthetic
experience, Schleiermacher sought a place for religion in the modem world as art rather than science. Thus the tensions between
individual religious experience and shared religious faith in
Schleiermacher's Protestantism were the same tensions between
individual subjectivity and collective culture that characterized romantic thought generally.
Schleiermacher's account of interpretation, as revealed in the
notes he compiled for his influential lectures at the University of
Berlin, is similarly eclectic: it makes meaning 13both a function of
individual subjectivity and cultural convention.
Before the art of hermeneutics can be practiced, the interpreter
must put himself both objectively and subjectively in the position of the author. On the objective side this requires knowing
the language as the author knew it....
On the subjective side
this 14
requires knowing the inner and outer aspects of the author's
life.
While interpretation is an effort at empathetic and respectful
understanding of the author, to understand an author is to ascribe
conventional meanings to her actions in a known cultural context
rather than to identify her interior psychological states. "[T]hat we
must consciously grasp the author's linguistic sphere . . . implies
that we understand the author better than he understood himself."' 15 Schleiermacher identifies the "idea of the work" with "the
content of the text and its range of effects.' 1 6 Knowing which au-

13 FRIEDRICH D. E. SCHLEIERMACHER, The Compendium of 1819 and the Marginal
Notes of 1828, in HERMENEUTICS: THE HANDWRITrEN MANUSCRIPrs 95 (Heinz Kimmerle
ed., James Duke & Jack Forstman trans., 1977).
14 Id. at 113.
15 Id. at 118.
16 Id. at 151.
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dience was being addressed and what effect the work was to have
17
on them, "the interpreter knows everything that is necessary.'
Thus Schleiermacher rejects any simple identification of meaning with the intent of a speaker, anticipating the modernist view
that all thought is mediated by language. Meaning is at once conventional and intentional, presupposing the availability of a particular linguistic medium:
Every act of speaking presupposes a given language. This statement could also be reversed . . . because language develops
through speaking. In every case communication presupposes a
shared language and therefore some knowledge of the
language.'8
[E]ach person['s] ... speech can be understood only in the context of the totality of the language .... An act of speaking cannot... be understood as a moment in a person's development
unless it is also understood in relation to the language. This is
because the linguistic heritage modifies the spirit.' 9
Anticipating structuralism, Schleiermacher sees language as a
system of relations, so that the conventional or "grammatical"
meaning of a sign depends not on an author's mental state, but on
its difference from other signs within the system. On the other
hand, anticipating poststructuralism, Schleiermacher sees grammatical meaning as ultimately indeterminate because languages are
not static or closed systems: they have past and future histories
which "trail off into infinity. ' 20 "Grammatical" interpretation is
not a logical investigation, but an historical one-the grammatical
meaning of a text consists in the meanings ascribed to its language
by all its possible readers, who are themselves assessing the likely
meaning of the text to possible readers, past and future. Hence,
the contextual factors relevant to the meaning of any given sign are
"infinite. "21
Accordingly, grammatical, or what we today call structuralist,
interpretation is necessary but insufficient for understanding a particular text. A text can be given a more determinate meaning by
supplementing grammatical with "psychological" interpretation.
Psychological interpretation concerns itself with the effect the author intended to produce on her intended audience. Yet these intentions also depend on a context that is infinite and indefinite.
17

18
19

20
21

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

98.
99.
100.
112.
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The author is not likely to have intimate knowledge of every member of her intended audience. Hence her expectations for how her
work will be read are mostly determined by her knowledge of the
same linguistic conventions that govern grammatical interpretation. For this reason, Schleiermacher anticipated the New Critical
position that the text itself is the best evidence of the author's intended meaning. "[O]nly from a person's writings can one learn
22
his vocabulary, and so, too, his character and his circumstances.
If the author hopes that the work will be read in future generations, she may have little clue as to how the work will effect her
intended audience.
Neither grammatical nor psychological interpretation could
yield determinate results on its own:
Language is infinite because every element is determinable in a
special way by the other elements. This statement also applies
to psychological interpretation, for every intuition of a person is
itself infinite. Moreover, external influences on a person will
have ramifications which trail off into infinity .... In order to
complete the grammatical side of interpretation it would be necessary to have a complete knowledge of the language. In order
to complete the psychological side it would be necessary to have
a complete knowledge of the person. Since in both cases such
complete knowledge is impossible, it is necessary to move back
and forth between the grammatical and psychological sides, and
no rules can stipulate how to do this.23
In Schleiermacher's view, however, grammatical and psychological interpretation could constrain and discipline each other.
Rather than speculating about all possible reactions to the text by
future readers, the grammatical interpreter should concern herself
only with the views of future psychological interpreters, those who
strive in good faith to understand the aims of the author. Rather
than worrying about the uncommunicated intentions of the author,
however, psychological interpreters should assume that authors intended the likely import of their text to those readers to whom it
seems addressed.
Schleiermacher reasons that for both grammatical and psychological interpreters, the likely effect of the text on its originalreaders is centrally, although by no means exclusively, important.
"[I]nterpretation cannot begin until [the] relationship [between
speaker and original audience] has been established." 24 Why, we
22
23
24

Id. at 113.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 104.
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may wonder, is the meaning-determinative audience the "original"
one rather than all subsequent audiences? Schleiermacher's answer is that posterities-temporally remote audiences-are assured only if a work is canonized in an institutionalcontext. Works
must initiate or join a tradition of reading to achieve longevity.
Hence, the first purpose of any text is necessarily the maintenance
of an institutionalized community of readers, which means motivating a current, particular audience to reproduce itself by disseminating a text:
We must not make a distinction between what the apostles
spoke and what they wrote, for the church had to be built on
their speeches .... For this reason we must not suppose that
their writings were addressed to all of Christendom, for in fact
each text was addressed to a specific people, and their writings
could not be properly understood in the future unless these first
readers could understand them. But these first readers would
have looked for what was specifically related to their own situations, and from this material they had to derive the whole truth
of Christianity. Our interpretation must take this fact into account, and we must assume that even if the authors had been
merely passive tools of the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit could
have spoken through them only as they themselves would have
spoken.25
Despite this emphasis on the original audience, original meaning turns out to depend on future meaning. Schleiermacher argues
that interpretation requires seeing a statement in relation to the
language as a whole and to "sense how the statement itself will
stimulate further developments in the language. ' 26 It is primarily
because the availability of a text to future audiences depends on its
canonization by previous audiences that the original audience is of
greatest interest: later generations of readers have more information about previous than future generations of readers, and each
generation has the first generation in common with all other generations. Thus, despite the dynamism of language, future readers of
a text are likely to have a good deal in common with its author and
original readers-else they would not identify it as worthy of attentive reading in the first place.
For Schleiermacher, then, interpretation is not a search for a
mental or metaphysical entity, the author's or the text's "true"
meaning. Instead, interpretation is a conventional practice of constructing meaning, disciplined by two assumptions: first, that to
25
26

Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 112.
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write a text is to intend whatever meanings are ascribed to it by
future readers; second, that to read is to ascribe to the text
whatever someone in the author's position would likely have
meant by such language to the people that then appeared likely to
read it. In short, interpretation assumes that writers and readers
participate in a shared convention.
Schleiermacher used two influential metaphors in describing
this practice of interpretation. First, he described the author's cultural context-the linguistic conventions familiar to the author, the
audiences available and known to the author, the purposes,
projects, and commitments available to a person of the author's
social position-as the author's "sphere" or "circle. ' 27 Interpretation should begin by "determining the sphere common to the author and the readers ' 28 and identifying "the whole circle of
literature to which a writing belongs. '29 Later contributors to the
hermeneutic tradition employed such
similar metaphors as "hori' 30
zon," "worldview," and "lifeworld.
A second, and related metaphor describes the interpreter's
movement between grammatical and psychological interpretation,
and between the perspectives of original and contemporary readers
as "circular." Each of these perspectives is instable by itself: the
text's "grammatical" or conventional meaning depends upon the
meaning ascribed to the text by future readers, which depends
upon their perceptions of the author's intentions, which depends in
turn upon the conventional meanings likely available to the text's
original readers, and so on. The context for each contingent interpretive judgment is supplied by other equally contingent interpretive judgments. "Complete knowledge always involves an
apparent circle, that each part can only be understood out of the
whole to which it belongs, and vice versa."' 3 1 "Also within each
given text, its part can only be understood in32 terms of the
whole.... Here, too, there seems to be a circle."
27 Id. at 115, 118.
28 Id. at 118.
29 Id. at 115.
.30 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 217, 269 (Garrett Garden & John
Cumming eds., Seaburn Press 1975) (2d ed. 1965) (importance of concept of a "horizon" in
thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and Edmund Husserl); THE HERMENEUTIC READER, supra

note 12, at 28 (Husserl's introduction of the concept of "life-world"); RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL, DILTHEY: PHILOSOPHER OF THE HUMAN STUDIES 345-84 (1975) (role of the concept "world view" in Wilhelm Dilthey's thought).
31 SCHLEIERMACHER, supra note 13, at 113.
32 Id. at 115-16.
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These circular metaphors have three important connotations.
First, they convey that interpretive judgments are validated by coherence rather than correspondence. Interpretive judgments cannot be straightforwardly confirmed by data, since they construct or
select the data on which they rely. Hence interpretive arguments
are inevitably circular, in the sense of being without foundations.
Second, in the romantic intellectual milieu, the value of coherence typically characterizes artistic rather than scientific endeavors.
The aim is harmony or symmetry among judgments, all of which
involve creative construction or invention: "The task [of interpretation] is infinite, because in a statement we want to trace a past and
a future which stretch into infinity. Consequently, inspiration is as
much a part of this art as of any other. ' 33 Interpretations are
judged by aesthetic criteria.
Third, the hermeneutic circle is cozy. None of the judgments
on which a-comprehensive interpretation depends can withstand
skeptical critique. Each must support the other. The world of the
author is similarly fragile, dependent on the interpreter's indulgence. The text can only be brought to life and the author's horizon recovered if each is approached tenderly and sympathetically.
Schleiermacher was raised in the Moravian reformed church and
educated in an insular religious community characterized by demonstrative fellowship and song. The hermeneutic circle implies
that communication is based on a similar kind of community. Linguistic understanding requires empathic understanding; and literacy depends on the virtue of Christian love.
Yet, what is perhaps most striking to the contemporary reader
is the extent to which Schleiermacher sees this empathy as an artifact of the imagination, necessarily mediated by a sophisticated
knowledge of linguistic conventions and institutional contexts.
Hermeneutic understanding requires the construction of, not communion with, the other.
V.

WHIG LEGAL THOUGHT

Lieber excepted, Whig legal thinkers were not greatly interested in language. But they did tend to assume that meaning was
conventional and publicly available rather than psychological and
recondite. And they were as explicit as Schleiermacher in their
view of interpretation as an institutional practice.
33

Id. at 112.
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Whiggism can be seen as a response to the striking contrast
between John Marshall's success in judicial politics and the failures
of the Federalist party in electoral politics. With the electoral and
cultural triumphs of Jefferson and Jackson, adherents to the Federalist persuasion lost their taste for the rhetoric of popular sovereignty, even as competitive electioneering compelled them to
mouth it. Fundamentally, the nationalism of the Whigs was a nationalism of elites and institutions; their nation was constituted by
law, into which popular will had been exhausted. 34 Their positivism was more like H.L.A. Hart's than John Austin's: more concerned with identifying authoritative law than with identifying the
sovereign. Typical of this institutional positivism was Whig leader
Daniel Webster's response in Luther v. Borden35 to claims that a
popularly organized referendum had dissolved Rhode Island's
malapportioned legislature and broadened its restrictive franchise.
The people of a State is the politicalbody-the corporate unitin which are vested .. . the ultimate powers of sovereignty; not
its inhabitants or population, considered as individuals .... Except as an organized body, that is, except when acting by its recognized organs, the entire population of a state already
constituted, were it assembled on some vast 3 plain,
could not
6
constitutionally pass a law or try an offender.
Webster's institutionalist argument anticipated the posture toward
Southern secession of erstwhile Whig Abraham Lincoln.
Legal interpretation lay at the heart of the institutional positivism that Whig lawyers developed in response to the populist
challenges of the antebellum period. Interpretation would enable
far-seeing stewards of America's institutions to preserve them from
periodic overthrow by adapting them to changing circumstances
and social needs. Successful accommodation of social change
would insulate prudent stewards against demagogic mobilization of
the populace, while institutional preservation would serve the overarching social need of ensuring commercial development by providing a stable and predictable environment for investment. Paul
Kahn has usefully summarized Justice Story's formulation of this
conservative hermeneutic program in his Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States:

34 PAUL KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

38 (1992).

35 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
36

JOHN A.

JAMESON,

A

TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS

233 (1867).
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Constitutional interpretation must begin with the text as an
expression of popular consent, but... [t]he text will often not be
self-explanatory. The necessity for interpretation creates the
possibility for judicial arbitrariness. To combat judicial arbitrariness, a science of law is required. Story, therefore, sets out the
"true rules of interpretation applicable to the constitution; so
that we may have some fixed standard."

. .

. [These] rules em-

phasize the need for openness to change in constitutional interpretation. If the ends of the Constitution are to be attained, the
means available must be responsive to the changing "manners,
habits and institutions of society, which are never stationary."
Unless the Constitution, permits change, the whole of society
will be "revolutionized at every critical period, and remodeled
in every generation." Maintenance thus requires a science of
law that can distinguish the permanent from the transitory.37
Story's view of interpretation as adaptation did not prevent his embrace of the antebellum commonplace that "[t]he first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all instruments is, to construe
them according to the sense of the terms and the intentions of the
parties. ' 38 Yet, like later legal formalists, he insisted that the only
discernible "intent" of legal authors was to adopt the language chosen: "Nothing but the text itself was adopted by the people. '39 The
vagueness of constitutional language and its function in framing a
government for the ages left interpreters a wide latitude to develop
its meaning over time. Rather than resorting to contemporaneous
interpretations of constitutional language, interpreters were better
guided by subsequent judicial glosses, especially if acquiesced in by
other governmental authorities. If the people objected to their judicially elaborated constitutional law, they could amend the Constitution through these other political organs of government.4 °
If "scientific" interpretation of the Constitution could preempt
the Jeffersonian program of recurrent revolution, the scientific interpretation of common law precedent could similarly preclude
Sysiphean cycles of codification and recodification. The codifiers'
dream of circumscribing the future in legislative language clear and
accessible to the common man was' chimerical and self-defeating.
Codes would inevitably be overly rigid and insufficiently complete;
once consulted, popular majorities could be counted upon neither
to keep silent nor keep a steady course. But if fickle majorities
37 KAHN,

supra note 34, at 41 (quoting Story in 1833) (footnotes omitted).

38 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

283 (3d ed., Boston, Little,

Brown & Co. 1858).
39
40

Id. at 287-88.
Cf. COVER, supra note 10, at 136-37;

KAHN,

supra note 34, at 41.
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were incompetent to improve upon the common law's fusty technicality, prudent interpreters like Kent and Story were confident they
could meet the challenge. As Robert Gordon explains, their common law treatises and decisions assumed that
[t]he corrective for the occasional irrationality of custom was to
submit its principles to a critical and creative control technique,
a complex amalgam of (1) a special theory of history, (2) a comparative method, (3) and an appeal to certain extrahistorical criteria of reason. Lord Mansfield was acknowledged to be the alltime master of this method. (1) The special historical theory
was that history had direction, especially in the American republic, away from hierarchy, superstition, technicality, and restraints on disposition of property and labor and towards
political equality, rationality, free disposition, and liberality in
rights definition.... (2) The comparative method consisted of
looking to the practices of other civilized nations-especially, in
matters of commercial law, to international commercial custom
and European civilian writers on it. (3) The final component of
the technique was ... a highly educated reason steeped in classi-

cal and historical studies, political theory, and the law of nations.
There were also metarules about when to apply the technique
liberally (when one was trying to facilitate commercial convenience) and when to hold strictly to precedent (when one was
trying to protect vested rights). 4 '
Custom retained an important place within the institutional
positivism of the Whig lawyers, especially in the area of commercial law. This fusion of custom and positive law was permitted by
their peculiarly institutional conception of custom itself as experience digested by legal science. Law reflected general rather than
local custom, modeled on the boundary-traversing commercial customs collected in the law merchant. Ordering commercial custom
as interpreted by courts was an institutional conception of commerce as a stable, predictable course of development through familiar trades. Commercial development therefore involved the
public nurturance of particular commercial interests, by contrast to
the Jacksonian identification of development with unrestricted individual opportunity. Whig lawyers believed the law should foster
merchants who, like themselves, were prudent stewards of the public interest. Properly channeled commercial development would
ensure continuity of political leadership; such desirable developRobert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practicein the Age of American EnterPROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 84
(Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983).
41
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ment was the social change to which law, including constitutional
law, must adapt. Because development involved merely the
proliferation of familiar enterprises, the legal and social conditions
for development could be distilled from accumulated experience.
Whig legal science could therefore prescribe
how people should behave toward one another in a wide range
of social situations in which neither they themselves nor the legislature had prescribed express obligations. Their private law
...
was full of what we would call obligations implied by law,
inhering in good custom, precedent, and general considerations
of public policy concerning persons of different status in their
relations with one another.42
Whig legal science supplied the antebellum lawyer with a professional identity as an interpreter of laws; but although resistant to
the broader culture trends of the Jacksonian era, Whig legal science lived less by challenging than by accommodating and interpreting the positivism and populism of its time. In this respect,
Whig tactics mirrored Whig ideology: the legal hermeneutic impulse was also the spirit of compromise. The Whigs' political leaders are remembered for accommodating slavery to preserve union;
Lieber spent the bulk of his academic career as a South Carolinian
on cordial terms with John C. Calhoun, prudently suppressing the
antislavery and nationalist sentiments he penned in private letters
to Charles Sumner. 3 The Whigs' willingness to deal could not, in
the long run, buy them political success. But their institutional positivism did persuade many Democrats, whose hostility to government could accommodate them to checks on popular sovereignty.
One Democratic publicist wrote, "[t]he people do not any the less
govern, by thus governing in a certain mode which they themselves
prescribe." 44 Theodore Sedgwick, Democratic appointee to various federal posts, who later authored an influential treatise on statutory interpretation aimed at limiting judicial discretion,
nevertheless agreed that "the constitutional check [on tyranny and
corruption] is the only one which people voluntarily assume, and is
the only one known, that is based upon a liberal representation of
42 Id. at 88 (emphasis omitted).
43 FREIDEL, supra note 3, at 233-58.

Lieber actually went so far as to hire a black
servant to accompany him on his job interview to reassure his hosts of his taste for slavery,
and he soon acquired slaves. Id. at 236. The price of his hypocrisy was high: twenty years
of suppressing his opinions could not overcome the suspicions that ultimately denied him
the presidency of the University of South Carolina; but when he resigned his position and
moved North, he left behind a son who died in a Confederate uniform.
44 GEORGE S. CAMP, DEMOCRACY 214 (New York, Harper and Brothers 1841).
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the popular will."' 45 The inroads Whig institutionalism made in

Democratic thought would later facilitate the mobilization of
northern Democrats to the Union cause.46
VI.

LIEBER's SYNTHESIS

In Legal and Political Hermeneutics, Lieber may be said to

have bred Schleiermacher's romantic philology with the Whigs' institutional positivism, to spawn an account of law as the hermeneutic perpetuation of institutions. The match was not implausible:
both movements frankly acknowledged that interpretation is an institutional practice, organized by the evolving aims and customs of
the institutions within which it took place. Both movements
tended to view both the writing and reading of texts as the deployment of linguistic conventions. Both movements thereby viewed
meaning for all practical purposes as public and social rather than
private and psychological. Schleiermacher grasped the further
point that because linguistic conventions are developed and altered
by usage within dispersed linguistic communities, conventional
meanings are inconsistent and instable. When read in light of these
traditions, Lieber's book emerges as a surprisingly pragmatic account of interpretation.
Originally intended as part of the Manual, Lieber's treatise on
legal hermeneutics was "the definitive defense '47 of the interpretive discretion favored by Whigs-although its meager sales 48 sug-

gest that Lieber preached to the converted. Lieber conceded to
prevailing Jacksonian opinion that the meaning of legal instruments depended on authorial intent, 49 that compacts should be
strictly interpreted to reflect the will of the parties, and even that
constitutions could be regarded as compacts.5 ° In point of fact,
Lieber rejected the Democrats' characterization of the Constitution as a compact of states-an enthusiast of national union in his
adopted and his original country, Lieber was a leading proponent
of American nationalism, 51 who would later write pro-Unionist
45 Theodore Sedgwick, Constitutional Reform, U.S. MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 563,
564 (1843).
46 RUSH WELTER, THE MIND OF AMERICA: 1820-1860, at 371-91 (1975).

47 COVER, supra note 10, at 137.
48 FREIDEL, supra note 3, at 178 n.14.

49 See LIEBER, supra note 1, at 7 [at 1897].
50 Id. at 166-70 [at 2008-11].
51 See Merle Curti, Francis Lieber and Nationalism, 4 HUNTINGTON LIBR. 0. 263
(1941).
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propaganda and advise Lincoln's War Department.5 Yet Lieber's
Legal Hermeneutics did not take Calhounian originalism straight
on; rather than debating whose intent should govern constitutional
interpretation, Lieber exposed the very aspiration to strict intentionalist interpretation as incoherent.
His argument proceeded from an expressive conception of
meaning reminiscent of Schleiermacher's and Hegel's. According
to Lieber, all linguistic expression is motivated by an impulse of
sociability, linked to religious and aesthetic feeling, to externalize
and articulate the self in a concrete, sensuous, and inherently social
medium. 3 Accordingly, meaning is not conferred on language by
private intentions that preexist their articulation; instead, meaning
inheres in language's use by communities of language users, especially institutions.
Lieber's expressive conception of meaning, enabled him to
qualify his assent to the prevailing intentionalism with a number of
formalist caveats. Like other Whig writers, Lieber held that textual
language was the best evidence of authorial motives. 4 Indeed, for
Lieber the presumed authorial motive was to externalize the self
by using the language employed. Yet Lieber's insistence on textual
indeterminacy meant that his reduction of intent to language was
merely a stratagem to justify an active interpreter. In the end, he
approved intentionalist interpretation, reinterpreted as the expansive interpretation of instruments in light of their institutional purpose rather than the "motives" of their authors. 5 He favored the
legislative articulation of goals in preambular language and the
publication of legislative debates to aid, though not to control,
interpretation. 6
Lieber mocked the aspiration to "strict" or "literal" interpretation as resting on a naive, even illiterate dichotomy between literal and metaphoric meaning. Following idealist philosophers,
Lieber insisted that the physical objects to which language refers
are distinguished from the flux of experience only by the constructive activity of mind.5 7 Accordingly, Lieber argued that all meaning is figurative or "tropic," so that the Luddite aspiration to purify
52 PHILLIP S. PALUDAN,

A

COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND

EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 23
53 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 1-4 [at
54
55
56
57

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

(1975).
1893-95].
99-102, 119 [at 1960-62, 1975].
128-29, 132-34, 176-77 [at 1983-84, 1985-86, 2015-16].
30-31 [at 1912-13].
22-23 [at 1907-08].
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language of rhetoric could only succeed at the cost of purifying language of meaning. 8
Lieber added that new metaphoric meaning is constantly being generated by the rhetorical creativity of communities of language users. With application to different contexts, concepts
become more or less specific, acquiring and shedding connotations
and implications. Because "these processes are going on at the
same time, with many people, 59 the meaning of a text is instable
and uncertain even at the very moment it is written. Even the simplest instruction depends on infinitely many contextual assumptions and can be reduced to nonsense by a perverse literalism.'
The more complex an injunction the more easily it can be traduced.
Men have at length found out that ... nothing is gained by attempting to speak with absolute clearness and endless specifications, but that human speech is the clearer the less we endeavor
to supply by words and specifications that interpretation which
common sense must give to human words....
The more we strive in a document to go beyond plain clearness and perspicuity, the more 6we
do increase, in fact, the
1
chances of sinister interpretation.
Sophisticated language users realize this historicity and contextuality of language and often frame their injunctions to the future
broadly, inviting future interpreters to use their good sense.62 The
impulse to control future interpreters through elaborate and precise instructions bespeaks dictatorial egoism and foolish naivet6.
Over time these superfluous instructions will become contradictory; they will hobble well-meaning interpreters with arbitrary absurdities, or license unforeseen mischief.63
Lieber showed that a static conception of meaning is inconsistent with the very legislative supremacy its proponents desire. Legislatures sometimes interpret earlier legislation: to treat these later
interpretations as authoritative would be to ignore the original intent of the enacting legislature. Official legislative interpretations
are therefore "authentic" and possibly "binding" but not actually

"correct. "4
58

Id. at 22-23, 54-57 [at 1907-08, 1928-29].

59 Id. at 14 [at 190].
60
61

Id. at 17-18 [at 1904-05].

Id. at 19-22 [at 1905-07].
See id. at 37 [at 1917-18].
See id. at 33-34, 86-87 [at 1914-15, 1951-52].
64 Id. at at 62-63 [at 1934-35].
62
63
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That successive legislatures composed of multiple members
may be fictively viewed as a single author underscores Lieber's
larger point that legal authors are institutions, whose identity over
time depends upon the very process of interpretation that naive
intentionalists fear.
It is one of the most efficient agencies in the civil progress of a
nation, that, certain principles being established, they should be
left to unfold themselves gradually, and to be expanded, modified, and limited, by the civil action of the nation itself, by the
practical political intercourse of society.65
Because interpreters are properly devoted to the perpetuation of
institutions, Lieber argued, they must set aside not only the original but even the contemporary meaning of a legal text when unforeseen circumstances arise which the text does not sensibly
address.66 Lieber called this process "construction" rather than
"interpretation":
Construction is unavoidable.... [RIelations change with
the progress of time, so that, after a long lapse of time, we must
give up either the letter of the law, or its intent, since both, owing to a change in circumstances, do not any longer agree....
Interpretation, seeking but for the true sense, forsakes us when
the text is no longer directly applicable; because the utterer, not
foreseeing this case, did not67 mean it, therefore it has no true
sense in this particular case.
The more drafters try to constrain future interpreters by framing
inflexible language, the more inevitable construction will become
because "[t]he benefit of the community is the supreme law....
Laws must be understood to mean something for the advantage of
society. ' 68 Accordingly, construction is frankly instrumental: "The
effects, which would result from one or the other construction,69may
guide us in deciding which construction we ought to adopt.
It is tempting for the contemporary reader to map Lieber's
distinction between interpretation and construction onto the familiar distinction between applying and making law, or the distinction
between judicial deference and judicial discretion. Yet Lieber insists upon the inevitability and desirability of judicial discretion.
The interpretation/construction distinction functions within his
argument to blame "noninterpretive" adjudication on misguided
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 32 [at 1914] (footnote omitted).

Id. at 44-45, 100-101 [at 1921-22, 1960-61].
Id. at 110-111 [at 1969] (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 124-26 [at 1979-82].
Id. at 136 [at 1988].
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legislative draftsmanship that deploys rules instead of standards in
a futile and counterproductive effort to limit judicial discretion.
Thus the interpretation/construction distinction should not be misunderstood as an expression of any naive formalism that purports
to legitimate adjudication as mechanical, neutral, or nondiscretionary. Instead, it distinguishes and defends two different ways that
judges exercise discretion, depending in part on the extent to which
legislators have foolishly attempted to prevent it.
Thus, Lieber's interpretation/construction distinction is parasitic not on the now disreputable distinction between following and
making law, but on the rules/standards distinction so important in
recent and contemporary legal scholarship.7" While some Critical
Legal Studies scholars have deconstructed this distinction, 7 ' others
acknowledge that few practicing lawyers or legislators would find
rules and standards indistinguishable. Consider Mark Kelman's
admission that
[i]t is possible to establish legal rules, increasingly detailed in
covering available cases, that can become mechanically applicable to the vast bulk of actual controversies, but practice may
well be settled only at the ... risk that it becomes openly arbitrary, that all rules become rules maintained simply for rules'
sake. The Realist hope that vague language will be rescued by
recourse to settled purpose is turned on its head in the CLS critique: language remains relatively clear, but a knowledge of purpose makes the clarity appear arbitrary.72
Kelman adds that "the use of nondiscretionary decision-making
procedures will inexorably lead on at least some occasions to results the policy maker did not intend. ' '73 That, in a nutshell, is
Lieber's critique of rule-formalism. Adjudication inevitably involves the discretionary application of standards: either legislatures
will provide them or courts will have to construct them.
Having established the inevitability of discretionary legal interpretation, Lieber consoled his readers that it posed no threat to
democracy. Lieber argued that because interpretation is the condition of institutional survival it is a broadly participatory process in
a pluralistic polity like America, permeated by institutions. In
70 MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kathleen
Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreward:The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
71 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
72 KELMAN, supra note 70, at 46-47 (emphasis omitted).
73 Id. at 15.
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Lieber's vision of an "organic" republic, legal interpretation was an
edifying process of deliberation, a universal civic duty.74 Arguing
that freedom from tyranny depended upon an ever-vigilant people
rather than written rules," Lieber concluded that the educative
benefits of the popular participation in the interpretive process far
outweighed the threat of judicial usurpation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In the end, the failure of compromise in the sectional crisis
would demoralize the Whigs and discredit their vision of an institutional polity unified by hermeneutic discourse. The Civil War bequeathed us a contradiction between our racially stratified society
and our aspirational constitution that no amount of interpretive ingenuity is sufficient to resolve. The result is described by Kelman:
"While settled practice is not unattainable ... settled justificatory
schemes are in fact unattainable. Efforts at norm legitimation are
radically indeterminate not because the source of authority cannot
speak clearly... but because, if pressed, she would not want to."'76
That legal interpretation is unequal to the task of reconciling our
society with our constitutional aspirations, however, does not mean
it is unequal to the everyday tasks confronting most lawyers.
Lieber saw that legal interpretation is a practice enabled by evolving linguistic conventions and institutional customs. In this respect,
he anticipated conceptions of meaning and justification later developed by pragmatists. We may regret Lieber's political conventionality-but his philosophical conventionalism has much to
recommend it.

74 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 64-65 [at 1935-36].
75 Id. at 67-68 [at 1937-38].
76 KELMAN, supra note 70, at 13.

